A Shocks and Punctuation Model of Anti-Corruption Reform: Evidence from Mexico
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.29265/gypp.v29i2.775Keywords:
corruption, anti-corruption, institutional change, punctuated equilibrium, shocks, MexicoAbstract
How and why do anti-corruption reforms happen in countries with systemic corruption? This work builds on thirty years of historical evidence from Mexico to develop a model of anti-corruption reform. The three reforms under study —1982, 1995, and 2000— happened as episodic punctuations after long periods of stability in the anti-corruption sub-system. The reforms were a consequence of exogenous and endogenous shocks that induced the political elite to approve them. The work also stresses the importance that reforming anti-corruption institutions and policies in countries with systemic corruption might have, an understudied subject in the literature —due to the literature’s “structural bent”, that is, an excessive focus on the economic, political-economic, and democratic structures that contribute to the control of corruption.
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