La capacidad potencial de influencia del sector industrial manufacturero: Un análisis del Programa de Inspección y Vigilancia Industrial en México / The Potential Ability to Influence of the Manufacturing Sector: An Analysis of the Inspection and Monitori
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.29265/gypp.v25i1.150Palabras clave:
política ambiental, contaminación ambiental, industria manufacturera, grupos de interés empresariales, environmental policy, environmental pollution, manufacturing industry, business interest groups.Resumen
Resumen. La investigación contribuye al estudio de los grupos industriales y su influencia en la regulación ambiental en México. Las industrias contaminantes poseen incentivos para influir y evitar visitas, de inspección y verificación, de la Procuraduría Federal de Protección al Ambiente (Profepa). A través de un análisis de componentes principales, se define la capacidad potencial de influencia de 62 ramas manufactureras, con base en sus estructuras organizativas y recursos de poder, y se estima un modelo para determinar qué efectos tienen los vínculos comerciales con el exterior, la producción, la capacidad potencial de influencia y la prioridad de inspección de la Profepa, en las visitas que ésta realiza. Los resultados del estudio señalan que las visitas de inspección se determinan por el nivel de producción, así como la prioridad que los sectores tienen para la Profepa; mientras que las visitas de verificación sólo se determinan por el nivel de prioridad.
Abstract. The research contributes to the study of industrial groups and their influence on the environmental regulation in Mexico. Polluting industries have incentives to influence and avoid inspection and verification visits of the Federal Attorney for Environmental Protection (Profepa). Through principal component analysis, it is defined the potential ability to influence of 62 manufacturing industries, based on their organizational structures and power resources. A model is estimated to determine what are the effects of trade links, production, potential ability to influence, and inspection priority for the Profepa, in the visits of the Profepa. The results indicate that the level of production, and the inspection priority for the Profepa determine the inspections; whereas level of priority determines the verification visits.
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